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COMMERCIAL LAW
Michael J. Herbert*
I. INTRODUCTION
This survey of commercial law in Virginia discusses significant
Uniform Commercial Code ("Code") cases decided by the Virginia
Supreme Court during the past year, as well as all significant stat-
utory changes made to the Code during the 1991 session of the
General Assembly.1 It also reviews selected Code cases decided in
the Virginia circuit courts and in the various federal courts sitting
in Virginia.
II. GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE CODE
Article I of the Uniform Commercial Code contains a number of
definitions and general provisions that are controlling in all Code
contracts, unless they are displaced by the provisions of a particu-
lar substantive article.2 In Charles H. Thompkins Co. v. Lumber-
mans Mutual Casualty Co.,3 the court, in a footnote, significantly
extended the coverage of Article 1 beyond its traditional scope.
The case involved a common law suretyship contract, specifically, a
payment and performance bond which was not covered by the
Code at all.4 Nevertheless, in construing the terms of the contract,
the court cited section 8.1-205(4) of the Code, which deals with the
proper relationship between express and non-express terms of a
Code contract. The court justified this reliance by holding: "this
Uniform Commercial Code provision is enacted in Article 1, the
General Provisions. Accordingly, it is not limited merely to con-
tracts for the sale of goods, but extends to all commercial con-
* Professor of Law, The T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A.,
1974, John Carroll University; J.D., 1977, University of Michigan. The author gratefully ac-
knowledges the research assistance of Timothy S. Feehan, The T.C. Williams School of Law,
University of Richmond, Class of 1992.
1. This survey is current as of April 1, 1991.
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1-103 (Add. Vol. 1965).
3. 732 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1990).
4. The Code only covers suretyship contracts to the extent that they are made part of a
negotiable instrument. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.3-415, -416 (Add. Vol. 1965).
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tracts."" The court's decision was technically in error, but certainly
justifiable; the application of Code rules to comparable non-Code
transactions is well established under the rubric "application by
analogy."
III. SALES
A. Applicability of Article 2
Article 2 applies only to "transactions in" goods, a phrase which
almost exclusively means "sales of" goods. One of the many issues
which arises under this provision is the circumstances under which
Article 2 applies to "mixed" contracts. A mixed contract is one
which involves some combination of goods, services, realty or other
property. For example, a contract under which one party is to de-
sign, manufacture, and deliver goods to another involves services
(the design and manufacture) as well as goods (the finished prod-
uct). Is the contract an Article 2 contract? A common law con-
tract? Or some hybrid of the two?
In analyzing the distinction between services and goods, most
courts follow the "predominant purpose test."7 If the primary
function of the contract is the rendition of services for a price, the
contract is a common law contract for services. If the focus of the
contract is on the end product, the contract is an Article 2
contract.
Construction contracts are obviously mixed contracts, involving
both the transfer of goods and the rendering of services. W.E.
Brown, Inc. v. Pederson Construction and Tile Co.' provides a
good basic overview of the application of the "predominant pur-
pose test" to construction contracts. In its analysis, which was de-
rived from an earlier Fourth Circuit case,9 the court considered
three main factors: "(1) the language of the contract, (2) the prin-
cipal business of the supplier, and (3) the intrinsic worth of the
materials involved." 10 Of these factors, the third consideration ap-
pears to have been the most significant. The court found that a
5. Charles M. Topkins Co., 732 F. Supp. at 1375 n.7.
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-102 (Add. Vol. 1965).
7. See generally 1 B. ZARrrsKY, G. McLAUGHLIN & N. COHEN, COMMERCIAL LAW & PRAC-
TICE GUIDE T 3.02[1][d] (1991).
8. 20 Va. Cir. 280 (City of Charlottesville Cir. Ct. 1990).
9. Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 706 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1983).
10. W.E. Brown, Inc., 20 Va. Cir. at 282.
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series of contracts in which most of the cost was allocated to mate-
rial and equipment, and less than half to labor, were Article 2
contracts."
B. Passage of Title
Generally speaking, Article 2's substantive rules place little or no
significance on the passage of title, even though it is an integral
part of an Article 2 sale. 2 It is also often necessary to determine
when title passed to the buyer. In United States v. Rapoca Energy
Co.,' 3 the court had to determine When a sale was completed and
title passed, to determine the seller's obligations under the federal
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. The goods
involved, coal, had been shipped to customers in a "raw," uncle-
aned state.' 4 The price of the coal was determined after the coal
was cleaned. The issue was whether the sale occurred before or af-
ter the customers cleaned the coal.' 5
The court noted that under the Code, "[u]nless otherwise explic-
itly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which
the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical
delivery of the goods . .. . The seller had no duties regarding
the coal after its delivery; nor was delivery a mere incident to
cleaning the coal, for "[the seller] was not shipping this coal to its
customers for the purpose of cleaning but for the purpose of selling
the coal to the customers."' 7 Based on these facts, the court held
the sale was completed as of the time of shipment.' 8
IV. A NEW PROVISION FOR LEASES
The General Assembly passed and the Governor signed legisla-
tion which added a new article to the Code, effective January 1,
1992.'1 The new article, Article 2A, adds a new range of transac-
tions to the Code - leases of personal property and fixtures. The
11. Id. at 283-84.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-106(1) (Add. Vol. 1965).
13. 751 F. Supp. 565 (W.D. Va. 1990).
14. Id. at 566.
15. Id. at 568-69.
16. Id. at 568, quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-401(2) (Add. Vol. 1965).
17. Id. at 569.
18. Id.
19. S. Bill 667, Feb. 2, 1991, Va. General Assembly (to be codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
8.2A).
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addition of Article 2A marks the first major expansion of the
Code's scope since its initial adoption in Virginia in the mid-
1960's. It is likely to become one of the more important articles of
the Code. The following is a short summary of the most significant
features of Article 2A.20
Most of Article 2A is based on Article 2 (Sales). However, some
provisions of the new article, such as those dealing with third party
rights and the lessor's right to repossess, are borrowed from Article
9 (Secured Transactions). Article 2A "applies to any transaction,
regardless of form, that creates a lease."'2 1 A lease involves the
transfer of use and possessory rights in goods.22 The term goods, as
used in Article 2A, includes fixtures. 23 Finally, Article 2A only ap-
plies to true leases. It does not apply to transactions that are in the
form of a lease but are actually secured transactions.24
The unconscionability provision in Article 2A not only encom-
passes the matters dealt with under Article 2, but also expands
unconscionability protection in consumer transactions. Consumer
lessees are specifically protected from unconscionable inducement
to enter into lease contracts and from unconscionable collection ac-
tions by the lessor.25 In addition, consumer lessees who are success-
ful in their claims of unconscionability are entitled to an award of
attorney's fees.26 However, if the consumer lessee's claim of uncon-
scionability is groundless, the article entitles the lessor to attor-
ney's fees. 7
The warranty rules of Article 2A are similar to the warranty
rules of Article 2. As under Article 2, the lessee has the benefit of
20. For more substantial treatments of Article 2A by the author of this article, see Her-
bert, Getting Better All the Time: The Official (Revised) Remedy Provisions of the Uni-
form Commercial Code's Article 2A, 96 CoM. L.J. 1 (1991); Herbert, Unconscionability
Under Article 2A, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 715 (1990); Herbert, A Draft Too Soon: Article 2A of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 93 Com. L.J. 413 (1988). For other general studies of Article
2A from the perspective of Virginia law, see Herbert, Introducing Article 2A: The New
Personal Property Leasing Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 15 VA. BAR A. J.
Spr. 1989, at 16 (1989).
21. S. Bill 667, February 2, 1991, Va. General Assembly (to be codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
8.2A-102).
22. Id. (to be codified at § 8.2A-103(1)(j)).
23. Id. (to be codified at § 8.2A-103(1)(h)).
24. Id. (to be codified at § 8.2A-103(1)(j)).
25. Id. (to be codified at § 8.2A-108(2)).
26. Id. (to be codified at § 8.2A-108(4)(a)).
27. Id. (to be codified at § 8.2A-108(4)(b)).
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any express warranties made by the lessor.2 8 Some lessees will have
the benefit of implied warranties, such as the implied warranty of
merchantability 29 and the implied warranty of fitness for particular
purpose.30 Article 2A implied warranties will probably not be very
significant because the lessor may easily disclaim the warranties,31
and they are not applicable in certain "finance leases. '3 2
Although the remedy provisions of Article 2A are far too com-
plex for detailed review in this survey, a brief sketch of the basic
principles underlying these provisions is provided. The lessor's pri-
mary rights upon the lessee's default are seizure of the leased
goods (by self-help if there is no breach of the peace), 3 disposal of
the goods, and recovery of money damages for loss of the bargain
as measured under several intricate formulae.3 4 Lessors are ex-
pected to mitigate damages; thus unless they cannot feasibly re-
cover or dispose of the goods, they cannot recover the entire rent
due under the lease.35
The lessee's rights upon the lessor's default are parallel. The
lessee generally does not have the right to obtain the goods from
the lessor. If the goods have not been delivered by the lessor, or if
the lessee rejects them, the lessee may obtain replacement goods or
chose to do without. In either event, the lessee may recover money
damages, either to compensate for the extra cost of a replacement
lease36 or for the difference between market rental and contract
rental. 7 If the lessee keeps the defective goods, the lessee may re-
cover money damages for the difference between the rental value
of the actual goods and the rental value the goods would have had
if they had been as warranted. 8
Along with these statutory rights, parties may craft their own
remedies. For example, the lease contract may contain a reasona-
28. Id. (to be codified at § 8.2A-210).
29. Id. (to be codified at § 8.2A-212).
30. Id. (to be codified at § 8.2A-213).
31. Id. (to be codified at § 8.2A-214).
32. Id. (to be codified at §§ 8.2A-212(1), -213). A finance lease is a three-party transaction
in which the "lessor" is actually acting as a financing conduit between the "supplier" and
the "lessee." Id. (to be codified at § 8.2A-103(1)(g)).
33. Id. (to be codified at § 8.2A-525(2), (3)).
34. Id. (to be codified at §§ 8.2A-527, -528, -530, -532).
35. Id. (to be codified at § 8.2A-529).
36. Id. (to be codified at § 8.2A-518).
37. Id. (to be codified at § 8.2A-519.(1), (2)).
38. Id. (to be codified at § 8.2A-519(3), (4)).
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ble liquidation of damages.39 It may also provide for limited and
exclusive remedies, so long as there is some reasonably effective
remedy and the limitation or exclusion of other remedies is not
unconscionable.40
V. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A. Revision of Articles 3 and 4
The sponsors of the Uniform Commercial Code, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute, have completed work on a block of pro-
posed amendments to Articles 3 and 4. No state has acted on the
proposed amendments as of Spring, 1991. The amendments are not
controversial and are expected to move quickly through the state
legislative process. The proposed changes are relatively minor;
however, they do modernize existing law and remove some errors
and anomalies in the existing Code.
B. The Form of the Negotiable Instrument
An instrument is "negotiable" for purposes of the Code if and
only if it meets certain formal requirements. The word "negotiabil-
ity" in this context has nothing whatsoever to do with the transfer-
ability of the instrument. "Negotiability" is merely a shorthand
way of saying that the instrument contains what the Code requires
it to contain and omits what the Code requires it to omit. For ex-
ample, the instrument may not contain any condition on payment.
If an instrument contains any condition on the obligor's duty to
pay the instrument, it is not negotiable. 4' A conditional instrument
is not subject to Article 3, but rather to the general law regarding
written contracts.
If the instrument contains language which incorporates or makes
the instrument subject to the provisions of another agreement, the
instrument is conditional and not negotiable. 42 The reason for
prohibiting conditions generally, as well as the incorporation of
other agreements specifically, is to make it possible for a person
39. S. Bill 667, February 2, 1991, Va. General Assembly (to be codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
8.2A-504).
40. Id. (to be codified at § 8.2A-503).
41. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.3-104(1)(b), -105 (Add. Vol. 1965).
42. Id. § 8.3-105(2)(a).
[Vol. 25:681686
COMMERCIAL LAW
taking the instrument to know what he or she is taking. Since a
third party has no sure way of knowing whether the condition was
met, there is no sure way of knowing whether or not the instru-
ment is payable at its face value or not.
The law, however, draws a clear distinction between the refer-
ence to another agreement and the incorporation of another agree-
ment. If the instrument merely refers to another agreement and
does not link payment of the instrument to performance of the
other agreement, it is not conditional and thus is negotiable, 43 as-
suming that the other requirements of negotiability are met.
In Sovran Bank, N.A. v. Franklin,44 the court examined the fol-
lowing language contained in a promissory note: "If this Note is
issued pursuant to a commitment letter, it shall be entitled to its
benefits and subject to its terms and conditions, including any
amendments thereto and any renewals or substitutions thereof.' '45
The court correctly held that this language precluded the instru-
ment from being negotiable." Of particular importance is the fact
that an existing commitment letter which conflicted with the
note47 was considered irrelevant. Even if there had been no com-
mitment letter, the instrument would not have been negotiable.
What is important is not the existence of the other agreement, but
the fact that a third party taking the instrument could not deter-
mine from the face of the instrument whether there was or was not
another agreement.
C. Holder in Due Course - Notice of Defenses
To qualify as a holder in due course - and thus to take free of
all claims to and most defenses on the instrument - the person
taking the instrument must act in good faith and be without notice
that a party to the instrument has a defense against its enforce-
ment.48 In most states, "good faith" is measured subjectively and
"notice" is measured objectively. However, in Virginia's version of
43. Id. § 8.3-105(1)(b)-(e). As discussed in earlier editions of this Survey, the distinction
between reference and incorporation is not always easily made. See Herbert, Commercial
Law: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 693, 707-09 (1987).
44. 21 Va. Cir. 376 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. 1990).
45. Id. at 377.
46. Id. at 377-78.
47. Id. at 377.
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-302(1)(b), (c) (Add. Vol. 1965).
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the Code, both good faith and notice are measured subjectively.49
The significance of this standard is apparent in In re Wills.50 In
Wills, the maker of a note argued that the holder could not be a
holder in due course because the holder had notice of the maker's
defense. Specifically, the holder was aware that the maker was
drinking heavily and had marital and psychological problems.5 1
The court held that, as a matter of law, this knowledge was insuffi-
cient to establish that the holder had notice of a defense.2
VI. INVESTMENT SECURITIES
Article 8 governs investment securities and is one of the most
obscure articles of the Code. It is the province of a rather small
number of specialists, and generates very little reported litigation.
In Young v. Young,53 the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the
Article 8 requirements for transferring ownership in an investment
security.
In Young, the key allegation was that Lehman H. Young, Sr. had
made gifts of stock in The Virginia Press to his daughters. The
stock in question was "certificated," or represented by a paper
stock certificate.5 4 The corporate records noted the transfer, but a
physical transfer of the shares never occurred.55 The court held
that no valid gift had been made .5  The court based its decision
largely on section 8.8-313(1)(a) of the Code: "[t]ransfer of a secur-
ity. . . to a purchaser17 occurs only. . . at the time he or a person
designated by him acquires possession of a certificated security."58
49. Id. § 8.3-304(7) (Add. Vol. 1965) states:
In any event, to constitute notice of a claim or defense, the purchaser must have
knowledge of the claim or defense or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking
the instrument amounts to bad faith. If the purchaser is an organization and main-
tains within the organization reasonable routines for communicating significant infor-
mation to the appropriate part of the organization apparently concerned, the individ-
ual conducting the transaction on behalf of the purchaser must have the knowledge.
50. 126 Bankr. 489 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991).
51. Id. at 493.
52. Id. In addition, the court rejected the claim that the maker's drinking problem and
mental illness constituted a defense on the instrument in the first place. Id. at 496-97.
53. 240 Va. 57, 393 S.E.2d 398 (1990).
54. Id. at 63, 393 S.E.2d at 401.
55. Id. at 60, 393 S.E.2d at 399.
56. Id. at 64, 393 S.E.2d at 401.
57. Note that the term "purchaser" in this provision includes a donee. See VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.1-201(32), (33) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
58. Id. § 8.8-313(1)(a). Note, however, that there are several other ways in which a certifi-
688 [Vol. 25:681
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VII. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. Article 9 and Article 2A
Article 2A, now adopted by Virginia, will partially eliminate the
need to determine whether a transaction is a true lease of goods or
a sale-and-security interest transaction. Many of the reasons for
drawing the distinction no longer exist. For example, now both les-
sees and buyers may enjoy the benefits of the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for particular purpose. More precisely,
lessees and buyers enjoy those benefits to the extent their lessors
and sellers do not disclaim them.
Nevertheless, the distinction between the true lease and the se-
curity lease is significant. Section 8.1-201(37) of the Code, which
sets out the distinction, has been amended into a statute of consid-
erable prolixity and complexity.59 Buried in a mass of prose, how-
ever, is a remarkably simple concept. The distinguishing mark of
the true lease is that the lessor retains valuable residual rights in
the goods.60 Essentially, this means that at the end of the lease
term the goods will still be valuable (i.e., their useful life 'will not
be exhausted) and the lessee will either return the goods to the
lessor or pay their fair value to retain them. 1 If the lessor does not
retain valuable residual rights, the transaction is a security lease
subject to Articles 2 and 9. Although this does not significantly
change existing law, 2 it does focus the courts' attention on the one
crucial factor of valuable residual rights.
B. Classification of Collateral
Article 9 contains rather detailed definitions of particular types
of collateral, such as "consumer goods"6 and "inventory. '64 In
many circumstances these classifications are quite significant. Mat-
cated security may be transferred; however, none of these were relevant to the case. For the
other methods of transferring a certificated security, see id. § 8.8-313(1)(c)-(e), (g)-(j).
59. Id. § 8.1-201(37) (Cum. Sup. 1991).
60. Id.
61. Id. § 8.1-201(37)(a)-(b).
62. See, e.g., Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Commercial Business Sys., Inc., 22 Va. Cir.
403 (County of Chesterfield Cir. Ct. 1991) (agreement under which lessee had the right to
possess and use car for lease term, at the end of which goods were to be returned to lessor,
was a true lease).
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-109(1) (Add. Vol. 1965).
64. Id. § 8.9-109(4) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
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ters such as the rights of the secured party upon foreclosure65 and
the proper method of perfection 6 are to a great extent determined
by the classification of the secured party's collateral.
In re Beacon Light Marina Yacht Club, Inc.6 7 illustrates the im-
portance of classification. Beacon Light was the owner of two
houseboats. First Community Bank (FCB) claimed a security in-
terest in these boats under a security agreement that described the
collateral as all the debtor's "furniture, fixtures, machinery, equip-
ment, inventory, and accounts receivable."68 The crucial question
was not the sufficiency of the security agreement, but whether the
security interest had been perfected. Because the collateral was
watercraft, the perfection rules of Article 9 did not apply; rather,
perfection was determined in accordance with Virginia's boat certi-
fication, titling and registration law.69 This particular law requires
perfection by notation on the certificate of title, unless the boat is
held as inventory. There was no notation on the certificate of title
in favor of FCB.7 0 FCB claimed that the boats were held as inven-
tory because time-shares in them were sold by Beacon. Noting that
Beacon kept both title to and substantial control over the house-
boats, the court rejected this argument and thus classified the
boats as "equipment" rather than inventory. 1
The court, however, did not fully consider another possibility.
Inventory includes goods held for sale or lease.72 Obviously, a time-
share arrangement has more than a passing similarity to a lease.
C. Place of Filing
Article 9 financing statements must be filed in particular loca-
tions so that subsequent buyers and creditors will know exactly
where to look to determine whether the seller or borrower has
granted a security interest to someone else. The rules are stringent
and require strict adherence, as illustrated in the recent bank-
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-505(2).
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-302(1)(d).
67. 125 Bankr. 154 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1990).
68. Id. at 156.
69. Id. at 157.
70. Id. at 158. No certificate of title had been issued for one of the two boats. Because of
this, the court also discussed the possibility that a security interest in the boat could be
perfected by taking possession of the certificate of origin. Since FCB never took possession
of the certificate of origin, the issue was moot. Id.
71. Id. at 157.
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-109(4) (Add. Vol. 1965).
[Vol. 25:681690
COMMERCIAL LAW
ruptcy court case of In re JJs Home Style Laundry, Inc.73
Automated Laundry Systems sold a coin operated laundromat to
JJ's Home Style Laundry (and its owner) in 1986. The seller's
rights under this purchase and security agreement were assigned to
Viking Credit Corporation. Viking filed financing statements at the
State Corporation Commission and the Alexandria Circuit Court
clerk's office. The Alexandria filing was erroneous because the local
financing statement should have been filed in Fairfax County.
4
JJ's and its owner subsequently filed for bankruptcy relief under
Chapter 11 and operated the business as a debtor-in-possession.7
5
Viking sought relief from the automatic stay and thereby brought
the erroneous filing to the court's attention. Viking claimed that
the debtors had intentionally misled it into filing in Alexandria
rather than Fairfax. Consequently, it argued that the court should
excuse the error. Nevertheless, the court held that any misleading
of Viking, whether intentional or not, was irrelevant. The filing
rules were meant to protect third parties, and the debtors in pos-
session were the representatives of third parties:
As debtors in possession, the debtors stand in the shoes of the trus-
tee, enjoying the same rights and duties .... Thus, the debtors act
in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of creditors, and to allow Vi-
king's claim to be treated as secured would work to the detriment of
the debtors' other creditors.76
The case is well-reasoned, but one caveat should be noted. If the
reorganization is successful, the debtor could benefit from the
avoidance of the security interest. This should not be permitted,
because in priority conflicts between the debtor and the secured
party, the perfection or non-perfection of the security interest is
irrelevant.77
73. 123 Bankr. 22 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990).
74. Id. at 23-24. Section 8.9-4012(1)(c) of the Code of Virginia requires that "a financing
statement be filed with the State Corporation Commission and also, where the debtor has a
place of business in only one city or county, in the circuit court clerk's office of that county
or city." Id.
75. In Re JJ's Home Style Laundry, Inc., 123 Bankr. at 23-24.
76. Id. at 24.
77. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-201 (Cure. Supp. 1991); Fehney v. Household Fin. Corp., 6
Bankr. 331 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981).
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D. Article 9 Rights and Mechanic's Liens
One of the many disputes that can arise under Article 9 involves
the conflicting interests between the secured party and a person
holding a mechanic's lien. The same property may be subject to
both the Article 9 security interest and the lien. Article 9 does not
determine the rights and priorities between those two interests;
rather, it is left to local mechanics' lien law. s
Newport News Shipbuilding Employees' Credit Union, Inc. v. B
& L Auto Body, Inc.7 9 examines one aspect of this issue: whether
the lienor must give notice to the secured party regarding its intent
to sell the goods subject to its lien. In a close analysis of section 43-
34 of the Code, the court ruled that the statute required notice to
be given in either of two situations. First, notice is required if the
secured party has filed a financing statement and the goods are
worth more than $600.80 Second, it is also required if the goods are
subject to the certificate of title laws and the secured party's inter-
est is noted on the certificate of title.8" In the latter case,
mechanic's lien law requires notice regardless of the value of the
goods.8 2
E. Formal Sufficiency of Financing Statement
Many security interests are perfected by the filing of a financing
statement in the appropriate filing office. To be effective, the fi-
nancing statement must meet certain requirements. For example,
the debtor and the secured party must be named.8 Ordinarily, the
name must be the debtor or secured party's actual name, not its
trade name. 4 However, minor errors in any part of the financing
statement, which are not seriously misleading, do not invalidate
it.85
If the financing statement uses the secured party's trade name
and not its legal name, then, according to the recent case of In Re
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-310.
79. 241 Va. 31, 400 S.E.2d 512 (1991).
80. Id. at 37.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 34-38, 400 S.E.2d at 514-15.
83. VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.9-402(1) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
84. See id. § 8.9-402(7). Note that by its terms this provision only applies to the debtor.
85. Id. § 8.9-402(8).
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Bumper Sales, Inc.,"8 the court may consider this mistake a minor
error. In Bumper, the error was not seriously misleading because a
subsequent searcher of the records could have easily discovered the
secured party's identity, and it was obvious from the financing
statement that the debtor's inventory could have been encum-
bered. 7 The decision is a sound one because the misnamed party
was the secured party, not the debtor. The single most important
piece of information in a financing statement is the debtor's name;
for if the party searching the records finds the name, it is at least
alerted to the fact that there is a security interest in the described
goods.
F. Self-Help Repossession
The secured party has a number of rights upon the debtor's de-
fault. One right is the right to seize possession of the collateral.
Repossession may be accomplished by "self-help" and without the
judicial process, if there is no breach of the peace. 8 There has
been a great deal of litigation over the definition of "breach of the
peace." Wallace v. Chrysler Credit Corp.,89 which dealt with the
self-help repossession of a truck, is an example of such litigation.90
In Wallace, the debtor claimed that several actions of the se-
cured party breached the peace. The repossession occurred at 2
a.m. with the repossession agent loudly racing the truck's engine,
barrelling down the street and frightening the debtor and his
daughter. When the debtor and his daughter subsequently spoke
to the repossession agent, he "very hatefully and gritting his teeth
pointed his finger at [the debtor] and his daughter" and
threatened them with jail.91 The court rejected the debtor's claim
for breach of the peace.
The court made several significant points which were well-sup-
ported either in prior Virginia law or in the court rulings of other
states. First, the repossessing creditor does not breach the peace by
entering private property to seize the goods; however, they gener-
ally may not enter locked buildings and must leave the property if
86. 907 F.2d 1430, 1434-35 (4th Cir. 1990).
87. Id.
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-503 (Add. Vol. 1965).
89. 743 F. Supp. 1228 (W.D. Va. 1990).
90. It also contains a short history of breach of the peace under both the common law and
the Code of Virginia. Id. at 1231-32.
91. Id. at 1230 (citation omitted).
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the debtor objects.2 Second, the creditor does not breach the
peace by using "stealth" in the repossession. For example, repos-
sessing an automobile in the middle of the night is not a breach of
the peace.9 3 Neither is noisy driving. 4 Finally, the court in Wal-
lace found that the alleged threat to put the debtor in jail occurred
well after the completion of the repossession. Only a breach of the
peace which occurs during the course of the repossession precludes
self-help under Article 9.5
Self-help repossession is permitted because, in theory, it reduces
the costs of repossession and consequently may reduce the cost of
credit. Article 9 attempts to balance this benefit against at least
one of the detriments of self-help - the risk of violence or blood-
shed. The decision in Wallace is in accord with Article 9's bal-
anced approach: the repossession must occur without any signifi-
cant risk of violence and without any more disturbance to public
tranquility than would occur whenever a somewhat noisy driver
passes in the middle of the night.
G. Disposition of Collateral
Article 9 gives the secured party considerable freedom in dispos-
ing of the collateral. There are only a few requirements: (1) the
disposition must be commercially reasonable; (2) in most cases the
debtor must be given notice of the sale and; (3) in some cases other
secured parties must be given notice of the sale.' The debtor may
waive its right to notice, but only in a writing signed after
default.9 7
What about guarantors? Is a pre-default waiver of notice exe-
cuted by a guarantor of the obligation effective? In Chrysler Credit
Corp. v. Curley 98 the court held that it is.9 ' This aspect of the case
is somewhat questionable, although it does have support in the
statutory language (which speaks only of waiver by the debtor, not
92. Id. at 1232-32.
93. Wallace, 743 F.Supp. at 1233 (citing Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Cole, 503 S.W.2d
853, 855 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1233-34.
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-504(3) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
97. Id. § 8.9-504(3) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
98. 753 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va. 1990).
99. Id. at 616-17.
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by guarantors).,00 However, the court's further statement that the
guarantor can waive the right to a commercially reasonable dispo-
sition of the collateral is problematic for two reasons.' 1
First, while the "notice" provision is of rather little significance,
the "commercially reasonable" requirement is not. Notice is
designed to give the debtor the ability to participate in the sale or
to seek out buyers. Rarely do debtors (or for that matter, closely
related guarantors) even attempt to do either. Thus, because ab-
sence of notice rarely has any effect, there is significant reason to
be too concerned about the loss of the right to notice. There is, by
contrast, a much greater risk that a commercially unreasonable
sale will cause injury to the debtor or to a guarantor.
Second, the Code does not permit the secured party's obligation
to act in a commercially reasonable manner to be excused from the
contract. "[T]he obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness
and care prescribed by this act may not be disclaimed by agree-
ment .. ."10 Of course, the guarantor's contract with the secured
party is not an Article 9 contract, and unless it appears on a nego-
tiable instrument, it is not even a U.C.C. contract. Nevertheless,
there is no reason why the Code's approach should not be adopted
by analogy. The net result of the case is that, vis-a-vis the bor-
rower, the secured party must always dispose of the collateral in a
commercially reasonable way. However, vis a vis the guarantor, the
secured party, under some circumstances, will be held to a much
lower standard - it may act unreasonably although not in a fash-
ion that amounts to "bad faith, abusive or grossly negligent
conduct."'10 3
H. Property Interests Subject to Article 9
Article 9 applies, by its terms, to security interests in personal
property and fixtures, sales of accounts and chattel paper.10 4 It
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-504(3) (Cum. Supp. 1991). Note, however, that the court's view
on this issue is questionable, since the Supreme Court of Virginia has previously extended
some of the protections given to principal debtors to co-makers of notes. See Rhoten v.
United Virginia Bank, 221 Va. 222, 269 S.E.2d 781 (1980).
101. 753 F. Supp. at 616-17.
102. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1-102(3) (Add. Vol. 1965). Note that the provision does permit the
parties to define the scope of these duties if their definition is not "manifestly unreasona-
ble." Id.
103. 753 F. Supp. at 619.
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-102(1)-(2) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
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specifically does not encompass interests in or liens on any real
estate (other than fixtures) "including a lease or rents thereun-
der." 10 5 This, of course, creates a significant question concerning
whether all payments of money regarding occupancy of real estate
constitute rents under a real estate lease. This question was ana-
lyzed in In re OceanviewiVirginia Beach Real Estate Associ-
ates.108 In Oceanview the question was whether hotel guest room
receipts were real property lease rents or personal property. Specif-
ically, the question was whether a creditor's interest in those re-
ceipts was governed by real estate law or Article 9. The court, after
an analysis of both Virginia law and various out-of-state prece-
dents, ruled that hotel room receipts for stays of less than thirty
days are personalty. Thus any security interest in them is subject
to Article 9.107
I. Failure to Comply with Collateral Disposition Rules
As noted above, the secured creditor disposing of collateral must
generally give notice of the disposition and must make the disposi-
tion in a commercially reasonable manner.108 Previous editions of
this survey have examined the effect of the secured party's failure
to meet these requirements.0 9 Generally, courts around the coun-
try have adopted one of three rules. According to the first rule, the
debtor must prove damages in order to obtain any rights against
the secured party. Under the second, the secured party is abso-
lutely barred from recovering a deficiency, whether or not the
debtor was injured. The third rule takes a more moderate position
- it creates a rebuttable presumption that the collateral was
worth the amount of the debt, effectively forcing the secured party
to prove that the debtor was not injured.110
The issue still has not been resolved in Virginia. Many reported
cases from Virginia's circuit courts and the federal courts sitting in
Virginia have opined that the Supreme Court of Virginia would
adopt the third rule. The last year provided further indication that
at least the Virginia circuit courts continue to lean toward this
105. Id. § 8.9-104(j).
106. 116 Bankr. 57 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990).
107. Id. at 58-59.
108. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
109. See e.g., Herbert, Commercial Law: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 24 U. RICH. L.
REv. 551, 561 (1990).
110. Id. at 561-62.
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moderate rule.111 Of the four well-reasoned opinions, two contain
especially useful discussions of the issue. 2
VIII. CONCLUSION
Commercial law in Virginia and throughout the country is un-
dergoing rapid change as the Uniform Commercial Code is over-
hauled. In just the past four years, Virginia has adopted two new
articles, Article 4A (Wire Transfers) and Article 2A (Leases).
Changes to Articles 3 (Negotiable Instruments) and 4 (Bank De-
posits and Collections) are imminent. More change is on the way, a
project for revising Article 2 has already begun. Although 1991 saw
relatively few significant Code cases, the adoption of Article 2A is
the most significant single development in Virginia's commercial
law since 1966.
111. See G.M.A.C. v. Ears, 22 Va. Cir. 322 (County of Fairfax Cir. Ct. 1990); L. C. Arthur
Trucking, Inc. v. Evans, 20 Va. Cir. 460 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. 1990); Smith v. Paige, 19
Va. Cir. 359, 365 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. 1990); Tazewell Oil Co. v. Miners & Merchants
Bank, 19 Va. Cir. 245, 253 (County of Buchanan Cir. Ct. 1990).
112. G.M.A.C, 22 Va. Cir. at 323-26; Smith, 19 Va. Cir. at 362-66.
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